Tourism Barometer by Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Dick Pope Sr. Institute Publications Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies 
1-1-1982 
Tourism Barometer 
Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies 
 Part of the Tourism and Travel Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/dickpope-pubs 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies at STARS. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Dick Pope Sr. Institute Publications by an authorized administrator of STARS. For 
more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 





VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1 
Few areas depend, as Florida does, on the expenditures of 
tourists for economic growth and vitality. To the extent that the 
number of visitors to Florida can be accurately predicted, the 
state's visitor industry should, among other things, be able to 
more effectively gauge seasonal and long-term employment needs, 
program advertising and promotional expenditures, establish pol-
icies for the purchasing of supplies, plan capital outlays for new 
facilities and expansion, manage inventories, and project tax 
revenues from tourism activities. In short, timely and reliable 
tourist projections should allow the state's visitor industry to 
more effectively and profitably serve those who visit Florida. 
The forecasts of out-of state visitor arrivals presented in this 
inaugural issue of the TOURISM BAROMETER are the result of 
well over a year of research and development of computer-based 
models and forecasting techniques by faculty researchers at the 
University of Central Florida. The TOURISM BAROMETER 
will be published on a quarterly basis. Each issue will contain 
updated tourism forecasts based on latest state-of-the-art forecast-
ing models. In addition, as the scope of the Dick Pope Institute's 
SPRING 1982 
research expands, new insights about Florida tourism will be 
presented. 
It is important to keep in mind that forecasting is as much an 
art as it is a science. For this reason, the four-quarter-ahead 
forecasts that will be presented in each issue of the TOURISM 
BAROMETER will have first been reviewed by a panel of visitor 
industry executives. This type of judgemental review is recognized 
today as an important step in the forecasting process because of 
the host of unpredictable events that can throw computer-based 
forecasts awry. 
The University of Central Florida welcomes this opportunity 
to serve the state's leading industry. And it wishes to express its 
appreciation to the Orlando Sentinel Sta.r and the Florida Div-
ision of Tourism for underwriting the forecasting research of the 
Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies. In addition, the 
University wishes to express its gratitude to the Orlando Chapter 
of the Florida Public Relations Association and leaders of the 
state's visitor industry for the important role they have played in 
establishing the Dick Pope Institute. 
Out-of-State Visitor Arrivals 
Millions Acrual ~------ Projecred ............ . 
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FLORIDA TOURISM FORECASTS 
OUT-OF-STATE VISITOR ARRIVALS -QUARTERLY 
1982-11 through 1983-1 
(Millions) 
% Change % Change % Changc % Change 
from from from from 




4.970 -8.4% 5.200 -6.0% 4.662 +1.1% 5.314 +8.4%(est.) 
2.665 0.0% 2.396 +6.5% 2.574 +3.1% 4.013 +6.8%(est.) 
7.635 -5.6% 7.596 -2.4% 7.236 +2.4% 9.237 +7.7%(est.) 
NOTE: Estimates indude visitor arrivals from within the ll.S. and Canada. 
Commentary 
The four-quarter-ahead forecasts above, as well as the graph on 
page 1, suggcsr that Florida visitor arrivals for rhe remainder of 
1982 will be off on the order of 2.1 percent. Arrivals are nor 
expected ro increase over corrcspondingquarters in 1981 until the 
fourth quarter -- and the antkipared surge in arrivals due ro 
rhe opening of EPCOT should initially be felt in the first quarter 
of 1983. Some visitor industry execurivcs feel rhat rhe forecasred 
5.6 percent decrease in second quarter arrivals may be too 
pcssimisric -- and cite encouraging advance bookings and rhe 
possibility of a strong April. At the same rime, most acknowledge 
that advance booking information is not as helpful as it once was, 
because vacation planning -- decisions to travel as well as 
decisions ro cancel vacation travel plans -- are not being made 
rwo months or more in advance, as they once were. One leading 
lodging chain, for example, has discovered that many of its gucsrs 
are planning vacation travel no more than rwo weeks in advance. 
One other important factor rhar must be kept in mind when 
considering second quarter visitors is rhar white-collar unemploy-
ment is at record levels throughout rhe nation. 
Of particula_r intercst is the relative strength of projected visitor 
arrivals by air beginning in the third quarter. Some might find this 
i . .. 
projected trend too oprimistic--anticipating that deep discount-
ing by major Florida-bound air carriers has to end, sooner rather 
than later. The projected increases in air arrivals, however, are 
based in large part on several lead ing indicators that point toward 
a stronger economy, lower unemployment, and increases in 
producriviry and real income starting in rhe second half of 1982. 
Overall, however, the third quarter at this time can be expected 
to be off by 2-3 percent compared to 1981-111. In fact, the third 
quarter could be off by even more -- depending on the impact 
of rhe World's Fair in Knoxville. Ar rhe same rime, however, 
summer month visitor arrivals could be better than projected if 
rumored "children free" promotions by some airlincs and theme 
parks materialize. 
The first quarter of 1983 is anticipated to be strong --
approaching the peaks reached in rhe winters of 1979 and 1980. 
Much depends, of course, on a stronger economy -- as well as 
public awareness and rcsponse ro rhe opening of EPCOT. 
Nore: The four-quarter-ahead forecasts prcsented above are 
based on several sophisticated computer-based mathematical 
"models" --which rake into consideration historical patterns 
of visitor arrivals, as well as a variety of economic indicators. 
Readers who are intercsred in a full dcscriprion of the forecasting 
methodology used to produce rhe projections discussed here 
should contact rhe Dick Pope Institute for a copy of rhe ''Tourism 
Barometer Methodology." 
The research and development of the forecasting models upon which 
the four-quarter-ahead projections presented in the TOURISM BARO-
METER are based, represents the work of several talented faculty 
members in the College of Business Administration at the University of 
Central Florida. Much of the early research was conducted by Dr. 
Richard Fritz, who also serves as editor of The Business Barometer of 
Central Florida. His work has been continued and. expanded by Dr. 
Charles Brandon and Dr.James Xander. These three professionals have 
worked together on a variet:y of other forecasting projects -- and, in 
fact, have attracted considerable national attention for work they have 
done in advancing the state-of-the-art in forecasting methods. The Dick 
Pope Institute is delighted to have their inputs in developing the tourism 
forecasts that appear in this as well as future issues of the TOURISM 
BAROMETER. 
(Left to Right) 
Dr. James Xander, Dr. Charles Brandon, Dr. Richard Fritz. . 
The Long-Term Forecast: 1982 - 1986 
It is generally agreed that beyond a couple of years, computer-
based forecasts of the future are normally circumspect. Yet, there 
is a need to forecast well into the future. One way of assessing the 
long-term future uses an approach called the Delphi Technique 
-- a technique the Dick Pope Institute has used to produce the 
following estimates of the annual percentage rate of growth in the 
total number of Hvisitor-days" spent by tourists vacationing in 
Florida over the 1982-1986 time period. 
1982 + 0.8% 
1983 + 8.1% 
1984 + 6.2% 
1985 + 5.7% 
1986 + 5.3% 
These long-range forecasts of the future of Florida tourism 
represent the combined judgements of 35 members of a panel of 
executives from throughout the state's visitor industry. 
Obviously, the growth of Florida tourism over the next five 
years depends, in part, on factors that are extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict: the national economy, the value of the 
dollar in overseas markets, weather, political situations throughout 
the world ... and even air fares. 
Most visitor industry leaders admit to being optimists by 
nature ... and offer many reasons for expecting annual growth 
rates exceeding 5 percent over the 1983-1986 period. The key 
cause for optimism is EPCOT ... but there are other factors that 
support at least cautious optimism, including the expectation of 
an improving national economy in the long-term, steady increases 
in the Sunbelt population, a resurgency of air charters, increasing 
popularity of tour packages with minimum l6igths of stay, an 
expansion of the family market as the post-WWII baby boom 
children move into their "full nest" years, and more meetings and 
convention trade for Florida. 
Many of those who are more cautious about the future of 
Florida tourism fear that a decade-and-a-half of significant 
inflation robbed Americans of discretionary income -- and 
that, even under the best of circumstances, increases in real 
incomes will be modest -- with slow growth in store for 
Florida tourism. Others have reservations about significant 
growth because of competition from in-home entertainment and 
the possibility that the novelty of theme park attractions is 
wearing off. 
EPCOT, of course, is a key. There is much optimism about the 
shot-in-the-arm it can give to Florida tourism .. ·• not so much in 
terms of bringing more bodies into the state but rather in terms of 
extending the length-of-stay, both by domestic vacationers and 
foreign visitors. 
Nevertheless, the bottom line may be, as one expert puts it, that 
the base is so large -- some 35 million visitors to Florida 
annually -- to think in terms of growth beyond 5 percent per 
year is stretching the imagination slightly. 
Vacation Travel Intentions: A "Leading" Indic'ator 
One of the things that can make forecasting very difficult is 
that it must rely almost entirely on interpreting and projecting 
what has happened in the past. Very little is known in advance, of 
course, about the future. 
One thing about the future of tourism that can be ascertained 
beforehand, however, is the tentative vacation plans of consumers. 
The Conference Board, an independent economic research agency, 
for several years has asked a national sample of consumers on a 
bi-monthly basis about their six-month vacation intentions. 
Although travel intentions information must be used with care 
and good judgement, research conducted by the Dick Pope 
As noted on page 2, many vacationers apparently are making 
travel plans no more than 2-3 weeks in advance -- and, thus, 
travel intentions information must be evaluated with great care. 
Nonetheless, the trends in the Conference Board travel intentions 
data lend some support to the four-quarter-ahead forecasts on 
page 2. 
Vacation Travel Intentions 
Insitute and other tourism research organizations indicates that 30 ---+--t----11--+--r--
travel intention data can sometimes be very useful in predicting 
shifts in tourism growth rates. 
The accompanying graph plots travel intentions data collected 
20---+--t----+--t----t-----tf---+-----t---+----i--~ 
by The Conference Board since 1971. Of particular interest at this 
time is the steady rise since the middle of 1981 in the percentage of 
consumers who have indicated that they plan on taking a vacation 
trip by air sometime during the following six months. This rise 10 1---+..,...~~--+~~r-.~~,.,,.~~---+ 
corresponds also with a steady rise in the percentage of consumers 
who express an intention to take out-of-state vacations. 
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DICK POPE SR. - "Father of Florida Toursim" 
by MARGARET MARY SCHARF 
The only university research institute in the country devoted 
solely to the study of tourism and related topics is named to honor 
a man as unique as the institute itself. Dick Pope Sr., known as the 
"Father of Florida Tourism" and founder of Cypress Gardens, is 
also known for his flamboyance, innovative spfrit and brash 
publicity schemes. His story parallels the story of Florida tourism , 
itself. 
Like so many Floridians, Dick Pope Sr. is a transpla!'ted 
midwesterner. Richard Pope was born in Des Moines, Iowa in 
1900. His parents, J. Walker and Lily Pope, moved the family to 
Central Florida in 1911. His father becan11: the manager for the 
Lake Wales Land Company, and young Dick helped out in the 
office. The youngster's innate sales abilities became apparent at 
age 12, when he sold his first house. After attending Stetson 
University, he went into the real estate business full-time with his 
father. It proved to be a successful venture for him until the time 
of the real estate "bust" of 1926. That same year, Dick Pope 
married Julie Downing. 
Dick Pope convened his success as a salesman and promoter, 
his theatrical ability and his love of water sports into a job with 
the fledgling Johnson Seahorse Outboard Motor Company. He 
simply packed his family into his car and headed for Chicago, 
stopping from time to time to send telegrams to Johnson, letting 
them know that their publicity problems would be over when he 
arrived. This began a relationship with the Johnson Company 
which still exists. During the three years that followed, his success 
as a publicist enabled him to open his own offices in Chicago and 
New York and to represent such companies as Jantzen Swimwear 
and Gulf Oil. 
During the Depression, Dick Pope decided to return to Florida 
with his family. He read a magazine article about a South 
Carolina man who had profitably opened his plantation and 
gardens to the public. So in 1931, in Winter Haven, Dick Pope set 
out to transform a swamp into Florida's first tourism attraction. 
The W.P.A., the city, the chamber of commerce and the canal 
commission were persuaded to participate in the "public gardens" 
project, but these groups later withdrew their support and 
received their money back. So the project only had the support of 
the Pope family and citrus pioneer John Snively. 
The success of the Cypress Gardens venture is largely due to the 
innovative ideas of Dick Pope and the artful direction of Julie 
Pope. In order to drain the swamp, it was necessary to dig several 
canals, which filled with water and ran throughout the gardens. 
Dick Pope used these to his best advantage by landscaping the 
canal banks in 1938 and installing the quiet electric boat rides 
which are still extremely popular. J ulit>'s !!reen thumb and Dick's 
interest in photography guided the landscaping design of the 
Gardens. Fach area was carefully laid out for balance, composition 
and color values. The result was a reputation as a "Photographer's 
Paradise." 
Once opened, the Gardens proved to be the ultimate publicity 
challenge for Pope, and he achieved phenomenal succe~s. Utilizing 
a formula he calls "OPl\12" (Our Photographic Materials timl"\ 
Other People's Money), he succeeded in placing pictures of the 
Gardens in most major publications and began sending out films 
for use in newsreels. Many of these included thl' water skiing 
stunts for which the Gardens eventually became t.111 1ous. Pope 
himself was the first to perform many of these stunts, including 
jumping off a ramp on water skis. His interest in water sports 
carried over to his children and their friends, and it was their 
casual performances in the Gardens that led to the famous ski 
show. When Pope left for the service at the start of World War I I, 
he left the Gardens operation to Julie Pope. Her resourcefulness 
prompted her to start a water ski show using the children to 
entertain visiting servicemen. The show became a permanent part 
of the attraction. 
After the war, Pope continued his media blitz and set out to 
conquer television, resulting in greater publicity for Cypress 
Gardens. A number of television shows have originated from 
Cypress Gardens. It is still the site of the largest syndicated show 
in the world, a religious television show entitled "Day of 
Discovery." Dick Pope also undertook an active role in the 
promotion of Florida tourism, both in his regular promotion 
efforts for Cypress Gardens, and in a number of civic activities, 
speeches and appearances. In 1965, he became President of 
Florida's Fair Authority and utilized his flair for publicity in 
making the Florida Pavillion <l leading attraction at the New 
York World's Fair. 
Ar 81, Dick Pope Sr. is still active as Chairman of the Board of 
Cypn:ss Gardens. Always aware of the potential for growth and 
innovation, he has directed hi~ efforts toward the development of 
nn\· section~ of the Gardens. He continues to take trips in search 
of lll'W and unusual plants for the Gardens, and to enthusiastically 
promote Florida tourism and the Gardens-. The naming of the 
Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies is one of the latest in a 






Prior to the Fall of 1973, those who are interested 
in explanations and forecasts of the number of 
visitors to a maior destination area like Florida paid 
little, if any, attention to the price and availability 
of gasoline. It has been impossible since that time, 
of course, to ignore gasoline prices and availability. 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was founded in 1960, but it was 1973 
before it began operating as a united cartel to raise 
the price of crude oil. During the past eight years, 
the retail price of gasoline has quadrupled -- and 
On January 28, 1981, after less than a week in office, President 
Reagan announced that he was bringing an immediate end to the 
price controls that had governed American oil for almost ten 
years, speeding up a process already set in motion by President 
Carter. With that simple act, the energy crisis of the 1970s ended. 
Apart from a few economists, probably no more than a handful of 
people have yet realized that the current collapse of world oil 
prices is the direct result of the American poople's decision finally 
to face reality. We have already swallowed the bitter medicine, 
and the cure is working. 
Let us take a look at what has happened since President Reagan 
decided last January to accelerate President Carter's 1979 decision 
to remove oil price controls by fall 1981, and thus to end, with 
one stroke, the long-drawn-out attempt to protect consumers 
from reality. 
For a few weeks, oil prices did rise, just as comsumer groups 
predicted. 
But then strange things started to happen. As late as December 
1980, the Department of Energy had been predicting that world 
oil supplies would remain tight "indefinitely," and rhar world oil 
prices might soon be moving up. 
Bur by March the major oil companies suddenrly found 
themselves with growing inventories on their hands. By May, 
refineries had a 20 percent oversupply of oil products, and started 
to cur prices. 
By the end of May, heating-oil prices were down throughout 
at a couple of points, there have been serious 
shortages of gasoline that clearly have had very 
adverse eff eels on tourism. 
The downturn in oil prices in 1981 has raised 
some important questions about gasoline prices and 
availability in the future. Some refuse to become too 
optimistic about stable oil prices or supplies in the 
long-run, noting -- as the Wall Street Journal did 
in a recent editorial -- that the maior oil 
exporting countries are hardly bastions of stability 
and, therefore, the possibilities for supply cutoffs are 
numerous. 
What can be expected in the way of gasoline 
prices and supplies in the 1980s depends on an 
understanding of all the important factors that 
influenced prices and supplies in the 1970s. An 
interesting perspective is provided by William Tucker 
in an article titled, "The Energy Crisis Is Over!" -
- in which he claims that the OPEC cartel has 
more or less been broken. The Tucker article 
appeared in the November 1981 issue of Harper's 
and is condensed here with the author's permission. 
It is clearly important reading for those in Florida's 
visitor industry. 
the country by four or five cents. The national average of gasoline 
prices across the country fell to its lowest level in two years. 
Sporadic price wars broke out in various areas. 
Before very long, these events started to have repercussions on 
the world marker. By early summer, every major OPEC nation 
found itself with growing stockpiles. 
OPEC's attempts at an emergency August meeting to reach 
agreement on a price, and regain "control" of the market, were a 
failure. Not only were the members unable to compromise on a 
unified price of $34-$36 a barrel, but their subsequent actions 
showed that the OPEC countries themselves are now at the mercy 
of the market. Two days after the meeting fall apart, Nigeria 
volunt~rily lowered its oil price from $40 to $36 per barrel. Ir was 
the largest price reduction an OPEC nation has ever imposed on 
itself. There is no indication that prices have hit bottom yet. The 
golden age of OPEC is over. 
How did this sudden reversal occur? There are many reasons, 
bur the crucial one -- both for its timing and its effects -- is 
the Reagan administration's decision last January to end price 
control. 
The beginning of the oil crisis of the 1970s can be traced to 
1968 and the first stirrings of the environmental movement. At 
the rime, though few people remember it, the country was 
operating under the Oil Import Quota System set up by President 
Eisenhower in 1959. The policy limited the country's imports ro 
no more than 12 percent of its total consumption. However, 
imports actually hovered around 19 percent throughout the 
1960s. 
The original rationale for the quota system was national 
security. It was argued that if we became too dependent on foreign 
sources for such an important commodity as oil, we might 
become vulnerable to cutoffs in time of war or national 
emergency. The effect of the program, on the other hand, was to 
give some protection to the small domestic oil companies. These 
are not the oil giants like Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, and the rest of the 
Seven Sisters. They are the hundreds and hundreds of entrepreneurs 
who live off small and medium-sized oil holdings -- and 
produce about 60 percent of our own oil. A great deal of the 
confusion that existed in the early 1970s arose from the failure to 
distinguish between these small companies and the giants. 
The import quotas protected the small companies from the 
dirt-cheap competition in the Middle East. 
The trouble began when environmental groups decided that 
newly discovered low-sulfur oils in North Africa and Indonesia 
were just what was needed to clean up air pollution. Before 
Lyndon Johnson left office, environmental groups in California 
and New York had wrung concessions out of Interior Secretary 
Stewart Udall (who administered the quota system) to allow 
more cheap, low-sulfur crudes to be imported from Libya and 
Southeast Asia as a substitute for coal in utility boilers. A number 
of incentives were introduced, and imports began to rise. 
Then an odd thing happened. Consumer groups, suddenly 
aware of all the cheap oil being pumped around the world, began 
to argue that scrapping the import quotas would produce a 
consumer bonanza we well. 
After the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969 created new concerns 
about offshore drilling, the environmentalists' urgings to lift the 
import quotas became much louder. 
Soon the case for importing more oil was common currency in 
consumer and environmental circles. 
Unnoticed, however, was that the real turning point in 
America's energy situation had already passed. In 1970, our 
domestic oil production peaked at 9.6 million barrels a day, after 
a century of steady increases. We had run out of "easy oil." Older 
wells were playing out, and all the new oil lay in environmentally 
troublesome areas - offshore, in Alaska, and in deeper, 
unexplored regions of the earth's crust. Americans faced a 
difficult choice. Either we had to accept a steep rise in American 
oil prices, to pay for the higher costs of drilling and encourage 
wiser use, or we had to open our doors to more imported oil. 
For a long while the Nixon administration resisted making a 
decision. Nixon was still impressed with the national-security 
argument, and leery of making the country dependent on foreign 
imports. 
Unfortunately, the courage of this position was obviated by a 
decision in August 1971 to impose an across-the-board temporary 
wage and price freeze. The controls had an enormous impact on 
the oil market. Prices should have been climbing rapidly. 
Production from old wells was leveling off and the development 
of new sources was proving expensive. A clear signal was needed . 
to tell consumers that the time had come to start conserving. 
Instead, the price controls seriously distorted the situation. The 
artificially low price of domestic oil discouraged expensive new 
exploration. But it also allowed consumers to go on guzzling oil as 
if nothing had happened. Nobody noticed that domestic oil was 
harder to find. 
And so, in order to make up for this growing gap between 
domestic supply and demand, we turned to the solution that was 
to become the characteristic pattern of the entire decade. We 
imported more oil. The holes that the environmental movement 
had already punched in the import-quota program made it easy. 
Without even noticing it, we were at the mercy of world events. 
As President Nixon's 1971 price freeze remained in place, the 
American economy became increasingly characterized by a series 
of surpluses and shortages. With prices held at rigid, artificial 
levels, the gaps between supply and demand became unavoidable. 
By 1973, steel, concrete, aluminum, and dozens of other basic 
Throughout the 1970s, our energy policy 
was to prop up world oil prices by creating 
a domestic shortage and then making up 
for it by buying in the world market. 
Without our support, OPEC would have 
been defunct by 1977. 
commodities were becoming unobtainable on the market. But by 
the middle of 1973 the price controls had been phased out, and 
these shortages quickly solved themselves. 
Oil, however, was an exception. So much pressure had already 
built up behind the price of oil that Congress became afraid to let 
the market go where it would. It was obvious that the days of 
twenty-five cents a gallon for gasoline were over. Yet Congress 
shunned the cure for America's falling domestic production. Oil 
became the only exception to the general abandonment of price 
controls; protection was extended through 1975. 
Meanwhile, barely noticed events in the Middle East were 
beginning to indicate that "cheap foreign oil" wasn't going to 
remain cheap for very long. In 1969, a colonels' revolt in Libya 
overthrew the pro-Western monarchy. The new military regime, 
under Colonel M uammer Quaddafi, soon realized it was supplying 
both Europe and America with low-sulfur oil that could hardly be 
matched anywhere else in the world. In 1970, the new government 
imposed a twenty-cent price increase on its concessionaires. 
The oil companies accepted the price increase; they had no 
choice. 
Soon a moribund debating society, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, founded in 1960 at the instigation 
of Venezuelan oil minister Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, was meeting 
in earnest in Vienna. By September 1973, OPEC members were 
presenting a solid front to the oil companies and negotiating for 
an across-the-board price increase of fifty-three cents to match 
Libya's efforts. The oil companies protested and said it was 
impossible. In truth, though, they weren't sure. When the 
negotiations finally broke down, Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi 
Arabian OPEC minister, said that the producing nations might 
just go ahead and do it anyway. 
Yet all the while American consumers remained oblivious. On 
the day Sheikh Yamani and the OPEC ministers broke off 
negotiations with American oil firms in October 1973, no 
American newspaper carried the story. 
What happened next, of course, is history. The Arabs realized 
their growing market leverage and exercised it in the oil boycott 
during the 1973-74 Arab-Israeli War. The result of this deliberate 
supply interruption was the first of the "gas shortages." 
But the boycott was over by March, and gas lines ended well 
before that. Far more important was that the producing nations 
- to their surprise - found they had a stranglehold on the 
Western oil market. They quickly raised prices to seven times their 
1970 levels, setting in motion what was later called "the greatest 
and swiftest transfer of wealth in history." Over the next year, 
some $112 billion flowed out of consumers' pockets and into the 
coffers of the oil-producing nations. 
What should we have done? Obviously, we should have 
increased domestic production and cut consumption. The formula 
for this was not really very difficult. Domestic oil price controls 
were already artificially discouraging production and stimulating 
consumption. Getting rid of them would have been the easiest 
step of all. Congress, however, had its own ideas. 
The battleground became the 197 5 Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act (a political euphemism if ever there was one). At first, 
Congress seemed wilting to go along with President Ford's 
assessment: foreign dependence was a problem, and price controls 
were only making things worse. But then a suburban rebellion 
began in the House of Representatives. Democractic legislators 
eventually succeeded in getting through a decision to extend price 
controls alt the way through 1979 and possibly beyond. Not only 
that, the Energy Research and Development Administration was 
instructed to lower the price of domestic oil in February 1976 in 
orderto punish the oil companies. It was Congress's election-year 
present to the nation for 1976. 
It worked well. Large Democratic majorities were returned to 
Congress at the end of the year, with a new Democratic president 
to lead them. Consumers were already celebrating by surging back 
to big cars, and guzzling gas again as if the boycott had never 
happened. Everything seemed fine. Yet the oil price controls 
remained a time bomb ticking away in the American economy. It 
finally exploded in 1979, and perhaps helped to carry away the 
Democratic administration with it. 
Few people seem to realize that OPEC's monopoly of the 
market lasted only about three years. Like any monopoly, it 
quickly attracted new competition into the field. From 1974 to 
1977, the relatively few oil-producing countries probably could 
have charged any price they wanted to Western customers. The 
new high price of oil sent geologists scurrying out all over the 
world looking for new reserves. In addition, the old patterns of 
ever increasing consumption were quickly reversed. The market 
forces had caught up and supply and demand were back in 
balance, promoting the wise and efficient use of resources 
everywhere. 
Gasoline consumption also resumed its pre-embargo climb, 
surpassing the 1973 record in 1977, and breaking it again in 1978. 
We were headed for even higher consumption in 1979, until 
events in Iran put a stop to it. Domestic producers, on the other 
hand, could not begin to hope to make back their money from 
drilling new oil. Once again there was a shortage of domestic oil. 
And yet there was no time between 1976 and 1979 that motorists 
couldn't get gas. How did we do it? The answer is the same. We 
made up for our self-inflicted domestic shortages by importing 
stilt more oil. 
It is commonly assumed that the events in Iran and the second 
"gas shortages" in 1979 finally curbed the nation's appetite for 
foreign oil. That is not quite correct. Redoubled international oil 
prices and the resulting rise in the cost of gasoline certainly 
reminded people of the realities of the world oil situation. But the 
effect would probably have been temporary once again, had not 
the second gas shortage finally convinced President Carter that 
domestic price controls were a self-defeating policy and should be 
abandoned. Carter bravely announced in late 1979 that he would 
phase out price controls by the fall of 1981. The payoff came 
almost immediately. Within one year, U.S. oil imports felt by 25 
percent, back to their 1975 level. 
Oil drilling increased as never before (although oil is still 
getting harder to find), and consumers finally began demonstrating 
hitherto unsuspected capabilities for conserving energy. President 
Reagan's January decision, which accelerated Carter's schedule by 
nine months, only completed the process. Drilling for new oil has 
increased by 50 percent in the last six months. Consumption has 
dropped another 20 percent. Domestic oil production is holding 
steady, and consumers - finally deprived of the "protection" of 
Congress - seem permanently set on a conservation course. 
The unanticipated -- though predictable -- result of this 
new realism has been that energy prices are now falling on the 
world market. Throughout the 1970s, our energy policy was to 
prop up world oil prices by creating a domestic shortage and then 
making up for it by buying in the world market. Without our 
support, OPEC would have been defunct by 1977. Now it is 
falling apart anyway. Americans are buying 2.2 million barrels a 
day less than we were before President Carter launched the repeal 
of the price controls in 1979. This is the exact amount of the 
current world glut. Left to the mercies of supply and demand, 
OPEC is finding it can do nothing more than set its prices where 
the market tells it to. 
Are we really out of the woods? Perhaps not entirely. We still 
import just over 30 percent of our oil, which is about where we 
were in 1973 just before the embargo. What we could do now is to 
put a modest tax on imported oil -- perhaps two dollars a 
barrel -- in order to pay the costs of building a strategic 
petroleum reserve; this would be a fair measure of the risks we 
.... oil price controls remained a time 
bomb ticking away in the American 
economy. It finally exploded in 1979 . 
incur by importing some of our oil. 
Is the energy crisis over, then? Not quite. Unfortunately, we 
still have a forty-year-old hangover to deal with -- the chaotic 
state of resources, created by government intervention in the 
natural-gas industry. 
The havoc is almost too complicated to delineate. Price 
controls were originally imposed in 1938 because of a supposed 
"monopoly." Actually, there was no monopoly at all. Consumers 
had a choice of several other fuels, and gas drilling is one of the 
most decentralized .industries in the country. One out of every two 
hundred Americans owns interest in a natural-gas well. 
The results have been utterly perverse. The natural-gas industry 
became a kind of national utility company. No one was ever 
encouraged to go out and find more. Y ct alt indications now are 
that there arc staggering amounts of natural gas -- perhaps as 
much as 200 years' supply at current prices -- in different kinds 
of formations in the earth. 
The situation finally reached a crisis with the "natural-gas 
shortages," of the winter of 1977. These "shortages," again, were 
nothing but the result of price controls. The law had never 
extended federal control over pricing within the producing states 
themselves. 
The hopelessness of government efforts to anticipate market 
prices can be seen in the 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act. The Carter 
administration finally decided on a phased program ending in 
complete decontrol in 1985. Congress, in its wisdom, decided to 
anticipate the future by allowing natural gas prices to rise to the 
1978 level of oil prices - equivalent to $15 a barrel - by 1985. 
Then they could go where they would. Yet in less than a year that 
price wa5 already hopelessly out of date. Taking inflation into 
account, natural gas consumers are once again paying 1960s prices 
for energy. 
There are already fears that when 1985 arrives Congress will 
find decontrolling the price of natural gas intolerable. Yet there is 
hardly a choice. In fact, removing price controls right now - as 
the Reagan administration is beginning to propose - would be 
even easier. Decontrol would unquestionably mean higher natural-
gas prices, but this would quickly be neutralized by a further drop 
in the price of oil and the introduction of new technologies. 
People are never going to conserve, or use solar energy in home 
heating, as long as they are paying fifteen-year-old prices for 
natural gas. 
But without the foreign oil needed to make up for the natural-
gas shortage, OPEC would be about as important to the 
American economy as a Turkish bazaar. 
The energy crisis, then, is half won. We have ended OPEC's 
dominance of the market within a few short months by 
swallowing what turned out to be a relatively mild pill and 
accepting a market price for our own oil. All we have to do now is 
decontrol our natural-gas prices, and we will be home free. There 
will be another mild period of adjustment, and soon we will be on 
a firm, stable, and innovative energy course. 
Are we up to it? Can Americans tackle the energy problems of 
the 1980s? 
Stay tuned. D 
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